Lessons from Russia’s parliamentary
early twentieth century
Study of Russia’s historical and politicalexperience beginning of XX century. Promotes better understanding of the socialrealities of the Belarusian society, allows a clearer idea of the difficultiesand possibilities of our movement toward democracy and the rule of law.
In Russia the beginning of the centurythere were signs of the crisis of the political regime, in which thecharacteristics of profiling is a monopoly position of the charismatic leader — the «autocrat». Any volume of the Complete Collection of Laws RussiaEmpire «convinces us that a decision on even the small, private issueneeds to sanction the king. He personified the hypertrophied role of the stateas property relations and the mechanism of their implementation, and in allother spheres of national life. To maintain this role, the ruling elite hassought to „streamline“ the political system, although the complexityof the structure of society and its problems reclaim.
On the growth of opposition sentiment insociety at large-scale social conflicts authority responsible only palliativemeasures in the sphere of political system. The stormy events of autumn 1905forced Nicholas II to sign the Manifesto of October 17 „On improvement ofpublic order“, which announces the introduction in Russia „unshakablefoundations of civil liberty. The State Duma was declared a “legislativeagency» to take part in which he promised to bring «to the extentpossible» those segments of the population who were excluded from theelections in «Bulygin» Duma [1, c. 199].
Consistent implementation of the principlesproclaimed on October 17 could lead to the design of the constitutional order. However,in late 1905 — early 1906 enacts a number of limiting civil liberties «temporaryrules». In April 1906, the text appears in the new edition of «Basicstate laws. Because of this „Code of Nicholas II“ disappearsdefinition of power of the monarch as unlimited, but remains its symbol — obviouslyambiguous — as „autocratic“. The most radical 86-I article „Code“reads: „No new law can not follow without the approval of the StateCouncil and State Duma and absorb force without the approval of the emperor“,ie for the monarch has the final say, and not determined by the necessaryprocedures advance the bill in case of disagreement with the Emperor. Next 87article provided an opportunity in the event of termination or interruption ofthe Duma and State Council to conduct debates in the Council of Ministers, withsubsequent confirmation by the king in the form of „His Majesty’s orders,take effect immediately. And the king retained the right to interrupt themeeting of the Duma and the State Council. Emperor could not enforce the lawsin the form of individually approved by the “acts of top management» [2,c.139]. In the exclusive jurisdiction of the autocrat were the foreign policy,finances, army and navy, the appointment to senior posts in the governmentbureaucracy. All other public institutions were of secondary nature. Nominally,reminiscent of some West European counterparts, Russia’s parliament (State Duma- the lower «chamber plus the State Council — » upper «chamber) reallyis not. Not institutionally integrated, functionally, these „house“ opposedto each other.
The State Council has remained the focus ofthe higher bureaucracy. The election of half of its members (the other is stillimposed king) did not essentially changed — The State Council provided its fullcontrol, and without the approval of the recommendation of the State Council ofthe Duma are automatically blocked. In some cases, the State Council are rightof the emperor. The legislative powers of the Duma were limited to a speciallaw that regulated its activity (»Establishment of the State Duma”):«The State Duma may initiate proceedings to repeal or modify existing andof new laws, except for essential public laws.» As already noted, outsidethe jurisdiction of the Duma was originally submitted by foreign and militaryaffairs. In fact, the Duma is not controlled and the state budget. If he didnot claim it, the government received the money in the amount of last year’sestimates. Formation of the cabinet, the choice of his head, just as the courseof the Government, determined by the emperor. The government was responsible tohim, but not before the legislature. Real leverage over the Duma did not havein this area. Over the period of the I and II, king of the Duma approved the612 legislative acts, of which only 3 were discussed and approved by the StateDuma and the Council of State [3, c.266].
The representative character of the Dumawas offset by the electoral system. Elections I and II, the Duma passed onestates and property curiae. For each of them identified their standards ofrepresentation. In multi-stage elections did not take part, women, military,students, many minorities. Dispersed the first I, then II, and the Duma, theautocracy has committed 3 June 1907 constitutional coup, while changing theelectoral law — without consideration of its Duma. The new law tightened therequirements of the property qualification, cut the peasant and working-classrepresentation, increased the prerogatives of landlords, sharply reduced thequota for the national regions. This provided the reaction of III and IV of theDuma, practically illegitimate in the eyes of much of the population.
Thus, the formal legislative andindependent Duma and State Council has actually performed the role of «zakonosoveschatelnyh»institutions, and reflect their opinions only propertied of the population ofthe empire. For all positions, they were dependent on the monarch and theexecutive branch. At relatively short period (1905 — 1907 gg) Block of publicinstitutions of the empire had lost signs of systemic. It actually restored theJune Third coup, but not on the new (liberal democratic) basis, and the old — theauthoritarian.
Crisis facing the regime, did not become anincentive to develop thoughtful course of reform and consolidation around theruling camp. The position of the monarch, dovlevshego all their authority, hasnot been consistent. Support Nicholas II’s reform efforts Witte and Stolypinwore a conditional, limited, autocrat obviously did not realize the need oftheir proposed reforms. The ruling elite, forced by circumstances to allow theopposition to participate in political life continued to arrogantly ignore it,provoking the process of radicalization of society. Activity even liberals havebecome more pronounced anti-systemic nature. Already in February 1911 OctobristMaklakov stated: «The idea of the center, the idea of sharing the renewalof Russia by the Government and the Duma was killed…» [4, c.57]. Bulgakovpainfully wrote: «In essence, the agony of autocracy continued reign ofNicholas II, which was all solid, continuous suicide autocracy… through allthe innumerable zigzags its policies and the latest insanity of war » [5,c.296].
Manifesto of October 17 and the electorallaw were the result of not consciously chosen strategy, as a consequence ofextraordinary circumstances. Instead of accepting the new conditions of thepolitical game, the ruling elite has consistently sought to restore the statusquo, their monopoly on decision-making. The result was the intensification ofcontradictions, the growth of confrontation, loss of power of legitimacy in theeyes of society, in the end — the forcible removal from the political arena — thecollapse in 1917
In the mass of the ruling elite has notgrown to awareness of the need of large-scale reforms in all major areas ofsociety. Vlastpriderzhaschie did not understand the need for a holistic policythat implements the reform programs on the basis of civil concord, assignmentsof the new socio-political forces.
«Huge, transformed into aself-sufficient force, the Russian state was afraid of initiative and activityof the Russian people, it will cease to be human burden of responsibility forthe fate of Russia… The state must become an internal force of the people,his own positive power of his instrument, rather than outside of thembeginning, not the master of his » [6, c.66].
Thus, the formal legislative andindependent Duma and State Council has actually performed the role of «zakonosoveschatelnyh»institutions, and reflect their opinions only propertied of the population ofthe empire. For all positions, they were dependent on the monarch and theexecutive branch. At relatively short period (1905 — 1907 gg) Block of publicinstitutions of the empire had lost signs of systemic. It actually restored theJune Third coup, but not on the new (liberal democratic) basis, and the old — theauthoritarian.
Crisis facing the regime, did not become anincentive to develop thoughtful course of reform and consolidation around theruling camp. The position of the monarch, dovlevshego all their authority, hasnot been consistent. Support Nicholas II’s reform efforts Witte and Stolypinwore a conditional, limited, autocrat obviously did not realize the need oftheir proposed reforms. The ruling elite, forced by circumstances to allow theopposition to participate in political life continued to arrogantly ignore it,provoking the process of radicalization of society. Activity even liberals havebecome more pronounced anti-systemic nature. Already in February 1911 OctobristMaklakov stated: «The idea of the center, the idea of sharing the renewalof Russia by the Government and the Duma was killed…» [4, c.57]. Bulgakovpainfully wrote: «In essence, the agony of autocracy continued reign ofNicholas II, which was all solid, continuous suicide autocracy… through allthe innumerable zigzags its policies and the latest insanity of war » [5,c.296].
Literature
1. The historicalexperience of the three Russian revolutions. V 3 kn. Kn.1. Dress rehearsal ofthe Great October Revolution: first bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia /by Society. Ed. PA Golub. — M., 1985.
2. Sorokin, AK fromauthoritarianism to democracy / AK Sorokin / Polis. — 1993. — № 1.
3. Eroshkin, N. Historyof public institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia / NP Eroshkin. — M., 1983.
4. Shelohaev, V. Ideologyand political organization of Russia’s liberal bourgeoisie 1907 — 1914 gg. / VVShelohaev. — M., 1991.
5. Bulgakov, SNChristian Socialism / SN Bulgakov. — Novosibirsk, 1991.
6. Berdyaev, N. Thefate of Russia / Berdyaev. — M., 1990.