MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE IN UKRAINE
KYIV NATIONAL LINGUISTIC UNIVERSITY
Department of English Grammar
Course paper
”Pragmatics: rules of conversation”
OleksandraIurchuk
group501
EnglishDepartment
ResearchAdvisor:
Kandidateof Linguistics,
ProfessorI.I. Seryakova
Kyiv 2009
Scheme
Introduction
PartI. Theoretical Aspects of Conversational Principles
1.1 Philosophical background
1.2 Cooperative principle byH.P.Grice
1.2.1 Maxims of conversation
1.2.2 Conversationimplicatures
PartII. Applied Aspects of Conversational Analysis
2.1 Following the cooperativeprinciple
2.2Flouting the cooperative principle
General conclusion
References
Introduction
Languageis the main device of communication. As a means to build a social relation,language has various functions. Malinowski in Halliday classifies languagefunctions into two big groups. The first is pragmatic, in which this functionis the further divided into narrative and active. In this case, the mainfunction of language is as a means of communication. The second is magical, inwhich language is used in ceremonial or religious activities in the culture.
Amutual understanding is inevitably needed by a speaker and a hearer in order toconstruct a good communication. There are times when people say (or write)exactly what they mean, but generally they are not totally explicit. Theymanage to convey far more than their words mean, or even something quitedifferent from the meaning of their words. Understanding anutterance syntactically and semantically is not sufficient since the meaning ofutterance is not only stated but it is also implied. In order to comprehend theimplied meaning of an utterance, implicature becomes unavoidably essential.Implicature is a proposition that is implied by the utterance in a context eventhough that proposition is not a part of nor an entailment of what is actuallysaid. Cooperative principles proposed by Grice mentions that a speaker makeshis conversational contribution such as is required at the stage in which itoccurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which heis engaged. [13] He, then, further divides the cooperative principles intofour maxims: maxim of quality, maxim of quantity, maxim of relevance, and maximof manner.
Tograsp the notion of communication, context happens to be completely importantsince speaker and hearer have to know the context in which the conversationtakes place. Therefore, understanding context can be a helpful way to know thespeaker and hearer’s intention.
Aimof the course paper is to define and describe the rules of conversationaccording to Paul Grice’s philosophy and their practical application.
Objectof the course paper is the Cooperative principle and Maxims of conversation.
Subjectof the course paper is the conversational analysis according to Cooperativeprinciple and Maxims of Conversation.
PartI. Theoretical Aspects of Conversational Principles 1.1 Philosophical background
Beforestarting to discus the rules of conversation, it is important, in our opinion,to mention some philosophical aspects of Grice’s work on language. The aim hereis to show the recurring themes in Grice’s work, by close reference to hispapers and also to commentaries on them.
Thefirst point to make is that there are two broad aspects to the Gricean program.There is the work on implicatures, with which we are largely concerned here,but there is also the earlier work on sentence-meaning and speaker-meaning. Ourposition is that although there are distinct foci to the two aspects of theGricean program, they are also closely interrelated: to understand themotivation behind implicatures, a basic understanding of Grice’s account ofspeaker-meaning, sentence- meaning and speaker-intention is also necessary.[6]
Paul Grice is best knownfor his contributions to the theory of meaning and communication. This work(collected in Grice 1989) has had lasting importance for philosophy andlinguistics, with implications for cognitive science generally. His three mostinfluential contributions concern the nature of communication, the distinctionbetwen speaker’s meaning and linguistic meaning, and the phenomenon ofconversational implicature.
Grice’sconcept of speaker’s meaning was an ingenious refinement of the crude idea that communication isa matter of intentionally affecting another person’s psychological states. Hediscovered that there is a distinctive, rational means by which the effect isachieved: by way of getting one’s audience to recognize one’s intention toachieve it. The intention includes, as part of its content, that the audiencerecognize this very intention by taking into account the fact that they areintended to recognize it. A communicative intention is thus a self-referential,or reflexive, intention. It does not involve a series of nested intentions–thespeaker does not have an intention to convey something and a further intentionthat the first be recognized, for then this further intention would require astill further intention that it be recognized, and so on ad infinitum.Confusing reflexive with iterated intentions, to which even Grice himself wasprone, led to an extensive literature replete with counterexamples to ever moreelaborate characterizations of the intentions required for genuinecommunication (Strawson, Schiffer), and to the spurious objection that itinvolves an infinite regress (Sperber and Wilson, whose own «relevance» theoryneglects the reflexivity of communicative intentions). Although the idea ofreflexive intentions raises subtle issues (the exchange between Recanati andBach), it clearly accounts for the essentially overt character of communicativeintentions, namely, that their fulfillment consists their recognition (by theintended audience). This idea forms the core of a Gricean approach to thetheory of speech acts, including nonliteral and indirect speech acts (Bach andHarnish). Different types of speech acts (statements, requests, apologies,etc.) may be distinguished by the type of propositional attitude (belief,desire, regret etc.) being expressed by the speaker.[3]
Grice’sdistinction between speaker’s and linguistic meaning reflects thefact that what a speaker means in uttering a sentence freque diverges from whatthe sentence itself means. A speaker can mean something other than what thesentence means, as in «Nature abhors a vacuum,» or something more, asin «Is there a doctor in the house?» Grice invoked this distinctionfor two reasons. First, he thought linguistic meaning could be reduced to(standardized) speaker’s meaning. This reductive view has not gained wideacceptance, because of its extreme complexity and because it requires the controversialassumption that language is essentially a vehicle for communicating thoughtsand not a medium of thought itself. Still, many philosophers would at leastconcede that mental content is a more fundamental notion than linguisticmeaning, and perhaps even that semantics reduces to propositioal attitude psychology.
Grice’sother reason for invoking the distinction between speaker’s and linguisticmeaning was to combat extravagant claims, made by so-called «ordinarylanguage» philosophers, about various important philosophical terms, suchas ‘believes’ or ‘looks.’ For example, it was sometimes suggested thatbelieving implies not knowing, because to say, e.g., «I believe thatalcohol is dangerous» is to imply that one does not know this, or to say«The sky looks blue» is to imply that the sky might not actually beblue. However, as Grice pointed out, what carries such implications is not whatone is saying but that one is saying it (as opposed to the stronger ‘I knowthat alcohol is dangerous” or «The sky is blue). Grice also objectedto certain ambiguity claims, e.g., that ‘or’ has an exclusive as well asinclusive sense, as in „I would like an apple or an orange,“ bypointing out that the use of ‘or,’ not the word itself, that carries theimplication of exclusivity. Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor (»Senses arenot to be multiplied beyond necessity”) cut back on a growing conflationof (linguistic) meaning with use, and has since helped linguists appreciate theimportance of separating, so far as possible, the domains of semantics and pragmatics. [3]
Gricehas been associated with the Oxford group known (mainly by their opponents) as‘Ordinary Language Philosophers’, who thought “important features of naturallanguage were not revealed, but hidden” by the traditional logical approach ofsuch ‘Ideal Language Philosophers’ as Frege and Russell.[7] However, it is veryclear that the concept, and use of, logic is considered a basic philosophicaltool by Grice. The relationship between conversation and logic is the startingpoint of Grice [9], it is considered important enough to be in the titles ofhis two main implicature papers (Grice), yet the concept of logic is rarelymentioned in the same breath as the CP.
Grice[7] starts with the long-accepted fact that formal devices representing thelogical functions of and and or, and so forth, diverge in meaning from theirnatural language counterparts. He then sets out briefly the extremes of the twoopposing positions in relation to this. The formalists take the position thatthe additional meanings which can be found in natural language areimperfections of that system, and: “The proper course is to conceive and beginto construct an ideal language, incorporating the formal devices, the sentencesof which will be clear, determinate in truth value, and certifiably free frommetaphysical implications; the foundations of science will now bephilosophically secure, since the statements of the scientist will beexpressible within this ideal language.” [9]
Whereasthe non-formalist holds that as speakers can understand the words which don’thave logical equivalence, then this shouldn’t be considered a deficiency in thesystem: language has other functions rather than serving science.
Grice’sposition is that the formalists are failing to account for the logic ofconversation – there are systems there, it is a question of identifying them:“Moreover, while it is no doubt true that the formal devices are especiallyamenable to systematic treatment by the logician, it remains the case thatthere are very many inferences and arguments, expressed in natural language andnot in terms of these devices, that are nevertheless recognizably valid. Ihave, moreover, no intention of entering the fray on behalf of eithercontestant. I wish, rather, to maintain that the common assumption of thecontestants that the divergences do in fact exist is (broadly speaking) acommon mistake, and that the mistake arises from an inadequate attention to thenature and importance of the conditions governing conversation.” Grice. [7]
Therefore,the aim of Grice [7] is to demonstrate the existence of a logic to theoperation of conversations. It is not about conversations being cooperative –that might be an outcome of the logical structure, but it is certainly not itsraison d’etre (Although it is very unclear that cooperation is such a featureof conversation.). The use of implicatures as an investigative tool in Grice [8]was not only to demonstrate the philosophical utility of implicatures, but alsoto demonstrate that structures which had evaded the grasp of formal logic couldbe accounted for in a systematic way. Thus the formalists’ argument for theimperfections of natural language is undermined: if meanings can be predictedreliably from forms, then their philosophical worries are unfounded. Of course,it is arguable that this aim has yet to be achieved, if, indeed, it ispossible. However, the point to be made here is that Grice has chosen his titlediscussion of this carefully, to reflect his wider interests. Grice [7] areabout logic, not cooperation. This is why the importance of logic recursthroughout his work on the philosophy of language, whereas cooperation per seis not mentioned elsewhere.1.2Cooperative principle by H.P. Grice
PaulGrice emphasized the distinction Voltaire makes between what words mean, whatthe speaker literally says when using them, and what the speaker means orintends to communicate by using those words, which often goes considerablybeyond what is said. A asks B to lunch and B replies, «I have aone o’clock class I’m not prepared for.» B has conveyed to A that B will not becoming to lunch, although B hasn’t literally said so. B intends for A to figure outthat by indicating a reason for not coming to lunch (the need to prepare his class) B intend to conveythat B is not coming to lunch for that reason. The study of suchconversational implicatures is the core of Grice’s influential theory. [8]
Grice’sso-called theory of conversation starts with a sharp distinction between whatsomeone says and what someone ‘implicates’ by uttering a sentence. What someonesays is determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered andcontextual processes of disambiguation and reference fixing; what she implicatesis associated with the existence to some rational principles and maximsgoverning conversation (setting aside «conventional implicatures»which we discuss below). What is said has been widely identified with theliteral content of the utterance; what is implicated, the implicature, with thenon-literal, what it is (intentionally) communicated, but not said, by thespeaker. Consider his initial example:
A andB are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks Bhow C is getting on in his job, and B replies: Oh quite well, I think; he likeshis colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet.[7]
Whatdid B say by uttering «he hasn’t been to prison yet»? Roughly, all heliterally said of C was that he hasn’t been to prison up to the time ofutterance. This is what the conventional sentence meaning plus contextualprocesses of disambiguation, precisification of vague expressions and referencefixing provide.
But,normally, B would have implicated more than this: that C is the sort of personlikely to yield to the temptation provided by his occupation. According toGrice, the ‘calculation’ of conversational implicatures is grounded on commonknowledge of what the speaker has said (or better, the fact that he has saidit), the linguistic and extra linguistic context of the utterance, generalbackground information, and the consideration of what Grice dubs the‘Cooperative Principle (CP)’: Make your conversational contribution such as isrequired, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or directionof the talk exchange in which you are engaged.[7]
Inother words, we as speakers try to contribute meaningful, productive utterancesto further the conversation. It then follows that, as listeners, we assume thatour conversational partners are doing the same.
Youcan think of reasons why someone might be uncooperative in conversation (maybethey’re being interrogated for information they don’t want to give up; maybethey hate the person they’re talking to; maybe they’re just crazy) but in thevast majority of conversations, it’s safe to assume that both participants aretrying to be cooperative.
Thisassumption (that the cooperative principle holds, and the people we’re speakingto are trying to cooperate) explains two things:
(1) why speecherrors are often ignored (or even go unnoticed) in conversation. As long as themeaning the speaker is trying to get across is clear, the listener usuallygives them the benefit of the doubt and focuses on the meaning.
(2) why we can findmeaning in statements which, on the surface, seem ridiculous, untrue orunrelated (i.e. metaphors, sarcasm, overstatement, understatement, etc.) Ratherthan assuming that our conversational partner is lying, crazy, or speaking atrandom, we assume they’re trying to get across some meaning, and we can figureout what that meaning is. [6]
Thecooperative principle can be divided into four maxims, called the Griceanmaxims, describing specific rational principles observed by people who obey thecooperative principle; these principles enable effective communication.
1.2.1Maxims of conversation
Thephilosopher Paul Grice proposed four conversational maxims that arise from thepragmatics of natural language. The Gricean Maxims are a way to explain thelink between utterances and what is understood from them. The Maxims are basedon his cooperative principle, which states, ‘Make your conversationalcontribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by theaccepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged,’and is so called because listeners and speakers must speak cooperatively andmutually accept one another to be understood in a particular way. The principledescribes how effective communication in conversation is achieved in commonsocial situations and is further broken down into the four Maxims of Quality,Quantity, Relevance and Manner.
Thecategory of Quantity relates to the quantity of information to be provided, andunder it fall the following maxims:
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for thecurrent purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
(Thesecond maxim is disputable; it might be said that to be over-informative is nota transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time. However, it might beanswered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable toraise side issues; and there may also be an indirect effect, in that thehearers may be misled as a result of thinking that there is some particularpoint in the provision of the excess of information. However this may be, thereis perhaps a different reason for doubt about the admission of this secondmaxim, namely, that its will be secured by a later maxim, which concernsrelevance [7]).
Underthe category of Quality fall a supermaxim – “Try to make your contribution onethat is true” – and two more specific maxims:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Underthe category of Relation Grice places a single maxim, namely, ‘Be relevant.’Though the maxim itself it terse, its formulation conceals a number of problemslike questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there maybe, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the factthat subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on.
Finally,under the category of Manner, which Grice understands as relating not (like theprevious categories) to what is said but, rather, to HOW what is said is to besaid, is included the supermaxim – ‘Be perspicuous’ – and various maxims suchas:
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.
Itis obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of lessurgency than is the observance of others; a man has expressed himself withundue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a manwho has said something he believes to be false. Indeed, it might be felt thatthe importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is such that it shouldnot be included in a scheme of the kind Grice was constructing; other maximscome into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality issatisfied. While this may be correct, so far as generation of implicatures isconcerned it seems to play a role not totally different from the other maxims,and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as a member ofthe list of maxims.
Thereare all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), suchas ‘Be polite’, that are also generate nonconventional implicatures. Theconversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures connectedwith them, are specially connected with the particular purpose that talk (andso, talk exchange) is adapted to serve and is primarily employed to serve. WhenGrice stated his maxims, the main purpose were a maximally effective exchangeof information; this specification is too narrow, and the scheme needs to begeneralized to allow for such general purpose as influencing or directing theactions of others.
Thesemaxims may be better understood as describing the assumptions listenersnormally make about the way speakers will talk, rather than prescriptions forhow one ought to talk. Philosopher Kent Bach writes:‘…We need first toget clear on the character of Grice’s maxims. They are not sociologicalgeneralizations about speech, nor they are moral prescriptions or proscriptionson what to say or communicate. Although Grice presented them in the form ofguidelines for how to communicate successfully, I think they are betterconstrued as presumptions about utterances, presumptions that we as listenersrely on and as speakers exploit.’[1]
GriceanMaxims generate implicatures. If the overt, surface meaning of a sentence doesnot seem to be consistent with the Gricean maxims, and yet the circumstanceslead us to think that the speaker is nonetheless obeying the cooperativeprinciple, we tend to look for other meanings that could be implicated by thesentence.
Gricedid not, however, assume that all people should constantly follow these maxims.Instead, he found it interesting when these were not respected, namely either«flouted» (with the listener being expected to be able to understandthe message) or «violated» (with the listener being expected to notnote this). Flouting would imply some other, hidden meaning. The importance wasin what was not said. For example: Answering It’s raining to someone who hassuggested a game of tennis only disrepects the maxim of relation on thesurface, the reasoning behind this ‘fragment’ sentence is normally clear to theinterlocutor (the maxim is just «flouted»).
Grice’stheory is often disputed with the argument that cooperative conversation, aswith most social behavior, is culturally determined. Therefore, the GriceanMaxims and the Cooperative Principle cannot be universally applied due tointercultural differences. The Malagasy, for example, follow a completelyopposite Cooperative Principle in order to achieve conversational cooperation.In their culture, speakers are reluctant to share information and flout theMaxim of Quantity by evading direct questions and replying on incompleteanswers because of the risk of losing face by committing oneself to the truthof the information, as well as the fact that having information is a form ofprestige.
Anothercriticism is that the Gricean Maxims can easily be misinterpreted to be aguideline for etiquette, instructing speakers on how to be moral, politeconversationalists. However, the Gricean Maxims, despite their wording, areonly meant to describe the commonly accepted traits of successful cooperativecommunication. Geoffrey Leech created the Politeness maxims: tact, generosity,approbation, modesty, agreement, and sympathy.1.2.2Conversation implicatures
Animplicature is something meant, implied, or suggested distinct from what issaid. Implicatures can be part of sentence meaning or dependent onconversational context, and can be conventional or unconventional.Conversational implicatures have become one of the principal subjects ofpragmatics. Figures of speech provide familiar examples. An importantconceptual and methodological issue in semantics is how to distinguish sensesand entailments from conventional implicatures. Implicature has been invoked fora variety of purposes, from defending controversial semantic claims inphilosophy to explaining lexical gaps in linguistics. H. P. Grice, who coinedthe term “implicature,” and classified the phenomenon, developed an influentialtheory to explain and predict conversational implicatures, and describe howthey are understood. The “Cooperative Principle” and associated “Maxims” play acentral role. Other authors have focused on principles of politeness andcommunicative efficiency. Questions have been raised as to how well theseprinciple-based theories account for the intentionality of speaker implicatureand conventionality of sentence implicature. Critics observe that speakersoften have goals other than the cooperative and efficient exchange of information,and that conventions are always arbitrary to some extent.[4]
Gricecharacterizes the notion of conversational implicature in such a way: A manwho, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated q, maybe said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that (1) he is topresumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the cooperativeprinciple; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q isrequired in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so inthose terms) consistent with the presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (andwould expect the hearer th think that the speaker thinks) that it is within thecompetence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the suppositionmentioned in 2 is required.
Thepresence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out;for even it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition isreplaceable by any argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not countas a conversational implicature; it will be a conventional implicature. To workout a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer will replayon the following data: (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, togetherwith the identity of any references that may be involved; (2) the CP and itsmaxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) otheritems of background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that allrelevant items falling under the previous headings are available to bothparticipants know or assume this to be the case. [7]
So H.P. Grice coined the term implicature for communicatednon-truth-conditional meaning:
• a conventional implicature is non-truth-conditional meaningassociated with a particular linguistic expression — E.g.: Even John couldn’teat the quince and locust fritters.
• a conversational implicature is not intrinsicallyassociated with any expression; it is inferred from the use of some utterancein context
(1) John’s been making a lot of trips to Paphos lately.
What is said: ‘John’s been making a lot of trips to Paphoslately’
What is implicated: ‘The speaker believes that John may havea girlfriend in Paphos’
Accordingto Grice [], another form of conversational implicature is also known as ascalar implicature. This concerns the conventional uses of words like«all» or «some» in conversation. E.g. I ate some of thepie.
Thissentence implies «I did not eat all of the pie.» While the statement«I ate some pie» is still true if the entire pie was eaten, theconventional meaning of the word «some» and the implicature generatedby the statement is «not all».
The implicatures are:
a) Context-dependent:
(2) A: Has John got a girlfriend? / Has John started hisChristmas shopping yet?
B: He’s been making a lot of trips to Paphos lately.
(3) A: I’ve run out of petrol. / Damn; it’s midnight alreadyand I’m starving.
B: There’s a garage just round the corner.
b) Cancelable (or defeasible):
(4) A: Has John got a girlfriend?
B: He’s been making a lot of trips to Paphos lately.
That usually means he’s on the pull, so I don’t suppose hehas a girlfriend.
(5) I’ve read some of those books.
In fact, unlike you, I’ve read them all.
(6) A: I’ve run out of petrol.
B: There’s a garage just round the corner.
They’ve run out of petrol, but might be able to call someonewho could help.
c) Non-detachable (usually), i.e. you don’t lose theimplicature by substituting synonyms:
(7) A: Has John got a girlfriend?
B: He’s been a regular visitor to the east of the Akamaspeninsula recently.
(8) I’ve completed a number of those tomes.
(9) A: I’ve run out of petrol.
B: You’ll find a filling station just beyond that bend.
• but some certain implicatures are detachable (because theydepend on the manner inwhich the utterance is phrased) — these will also beaddressed under flouting below:
(10) She produced a series of sounds that roughlycorresponded to the score of I am alive.
(11) She sang I am alive.
d) Non-conventional (as different from cancelability ornon-detachability):
(12) John’s a machine.
e) Calculable:
Conversational implicatures should be calculable from themeaning of what is said plus identifiable aspects of the context
There are three ways to generate conversational implicatures:
1. Observing the maxims
(13) A: I’ve run out of petrol.
B: There’s a garage just round the corner.
If B’s answer is relevant and informative, but not tooinformative (i.e. with useless,misleading information), it must connect to A’sstatement. 4
2. Violating a maxim
(14) A: Where does Gerard live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France.
B violates Quantity (less information than ‘required’). Sohow is this co-operative?
Answer:This way B adheres to Quality (don’t say what you knowto be false/lack evidence for).So the implicature is: B doesn’t know exactlywhere Gerard lives.
3. Flouting maxims (exploitation)
Violating a maxim is enforced (usually by clashing maxims).
Flouting is deliberate:
(15) A: What if the USA blocks EU-accession of Cyprus?
B: Oh come on, Europe has all the power! (flouting Quality)
(16) John is John. (flouting Quantity)
(17) A: I do think Mrs Jenkins is an old windbag, don’t you?
B: Huh, lovely weather for March, isn’t it? (floutingRelevance)
(18) Johnny: Hey Sally, let’s play marbles.
Mother: How is your homework getting along, Johnny? (floutingRelevance)
(19) She produced a series of sounds that roughlycorresponded to the score of I am alive.(flouting Manner)
• flouting is effectively an invitation to find a newmeaning, beyond ‘what is said’ — one that makes the utterance co-operativeafter all
• flouting is generally associated with particular rhetoricaleffects
Opting out
A speaker may ‘opt out’ of the Co-operative Principle, i.e.being openly uncooperative:
(20) My lips are sealed; I can say no more.[12]
Part II. Applied Aspects of Conversational Analysis 2.1 Following the cooperative principle
Conversationmakes sense to us because they follow certain principles. this is also truewith written texts. Grice has outlined the principles in his CooperativePrinciples (CP), that means to have conversation as ‘cooperative venture’.Cooperative venture is to get an effective, efficient conversation. So the CPis a mean to make conversation as is effective and efficient one. There arefour maxims in the Cooperative Princples.
1. Be relevant (Maxims of relevance)
Makeyour contribution relevant to the interaction.
Indicateany way that it is not
Examples:
(a) Pass the salt.
Implicate:Pass the salt now.
(b): A: How are youdoing in school?
B:Not too well, actually. I’m failing two of my classes.
vs. B: What fineweather we’re having lately!
2.Be informative (Maxim of quantity)
Makeyour contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of theexchange.
Donot make your contribution more informative than is required.
Examples: (a) A: Where is thepost office?
B:Down the road, about 50 metres past the second left.
vs. B: Not far.
(b)A: How did Harry face in court the other day?
B:Oh, he got fine.
B’scontribution is what required from A’s utterance. However, still B will becondemned asa being a wrong informer, if then, for example, Harry gets lifesentence.
3.Be truthful (Maxim of quality).
Orsay things believed to be true and don’t say ones believed to be false.
Examples:(a) John has two PhDs.
Implicates:that I know that John has, and have adequate evidence that he has.
A:Should I buy my son this new sports car?
B: Idon’t know if that’s such a good idea. He’s totaled two cars since he got hislicense last year.
vs. B: No, he seems likehe’d be a bad driver.
4.Be clear (Maxim of manner)
Avoidunnecessary prolixity
Avoidambiguity.
Bebrief.
Beorderly.
Examples:A: Where was Alfred yesterday?
B:He went to the store and bought some whiskey.
Bis being perspicuous to A. He gives clear response to A.
A:What did you think of that movie?
B: Iliked the creative storyline. The ending was really a surprise!
vs. B: It wasinterestingly done, sir.
PaulGrice admitted that the CP and Maxims of conversation could be applied not onlyin talk exchange, but also in sphere of transaction.[] He discovered that manypeople act according to these principles because they were taught to act insuch a way and they did not lost this habit.
Hetried to find a basis for such behavior and found out that ‘standard type ofconversational practice not merely as something that all or most do in factfollow but as something that it is reasonable for us to follow, that we shouldnot abandon.’[8]
Talkexchanges have certain features that jointly distinguish cooperativetransactions:
1.The participants have some common immediate aim, even though their ultimateaims may be independent and even in conflict. In characteristic talk exchange,there is a common aim even if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second–order one, namely ,that each partly should, for the time being, identifyhimself with the transitory conversational interests of the other.
2.The contributions of the participants should be dovetailed, mutually dependent.
3.There is some sort of understanding (which may be explicit but which is oftentacit) that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue inappropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate. [7]
Inspite of that no one ever follows to all the maxims far all time, we might evendo not need to, because as we can see, we may rely on implicature, to get thepoint of our addresser’s idea.
2.2Flouting the cooperative principle
Inthe previous part, it was admitted that CP and maxims of conversation help thespeaker and the hearer to understand each other.
Withoutcooperation, human interaction would be far more difficult andcounterproductive. Therefore, the Cooperative Principle and the Gricean Maximsare not specific to conversation but to interaction as a whole. For example, itwould not make sense to reply to a question about the weather with an answerabout groceries because it would violate the Maxim of Relation. Likewise,responding to a request for some milk with an entire gallon instead of a glasswould violate the Maxim of Quantity.
However,it is possible to flout a maxim intentionally or unconsciously and therebyconvey a different meaning than what is literally spoken. Many times inconversation, this flouting is manipulated by a speaker to produce a negativepragmatic effect, as with sarcasm or irony. The Gricean Maxims are thereforeoften purposefully flouted by comedians and writers, who may hide the completetruth and manipulate their words for the effect of the story and the sake ofthe reader’s experience.
Speakerswho deliberately flout the maxims usually intend for their listener tounderstand their underlying implication. Therefore, cooperation is still takingplace, but no longer on the literal level. Conversationalists can assume thatwhen speakers intentionally flout a maxim, they still do so with the aim ofexpressing some thought. Thus, the Gricean Maxims serve a purpose both whenthey are followed and when they are flouted.
Thereare several ways/reasons a speaker might break one of the rules:
1. Violating the Cooperative Principle. One instance in which aspeaker might break the maxim of quality is if they are really trying todeceive the listener; but this would also be a violation of the cooperativeprinciple.
2. Signaling a violation (minor violation). A person mightessentially come out and tell you they are violating a maxim and why.
Examples.
“Idon’t know if this is relevant, but…” (relation)
“I’mnot sure how to say this, but…” (manner)
“Ican’t tell you; I’m sworn to secrecy.” (quantity)
“Thisis just the word on the street; I can’t vouch for this information.” (quality)
3. Maxim clash. A speaker might violate one maxim in order topreserve another.
Example.
Carsonis driving John to Meredith’s house.
CARSON:Where does Meredith live?
JOHN:Nevada.
Maximviolated:Quantity.
Why:There is clash between quantity and quality. Carson is looking for a streetaddress, but John gives a weaker, less informative statement (hence thequantity violation). If John really doesn’t know anything more specific,however, he cannot give a more informative statement without violating quality.[18]
4. “Flouting” a maxim (major violation) to create a conversationalimplicature. By clearly and obviously violating a maxim, you can implysomething beyond what you say.
Speakersshould give enough information as necessary in order to understand the currentconversation, but not provide more information than expected. This is known asthe maxim of quantity, giving just the right amount of details so that theconversation flows smoothly.
Ia. Aflouting of the first maxim of Quantity:
Examples:
1.Professor P. writes a letter of recommendation for Lucy when she applies for aprogramming job. The letter states, «Lucy is neat and well-dressed, comesto class on time, and has nice handwriting.»
Theletter is a blatant violation of several of the maxims, notably Quantity(insufficient information is given about Lucy’s ability to program) andRelevance (irrelevant information is given).
Butif the recipient of the letter assumes that Prof. P. is being cooperativeoverall, the recipient will conclude that the lack of information about Lucy’sjob skills is a way of communicating that they are insufficient, withoutexplicitly saying so [8]
2. A:What should I do to get rid of this headache, Doctor?
B:Take some medicine.
Implication:B has not provided enough information – B did not say what medicine to take.
3. A:Where does C live?
B:Somewhere in the South of France.
Implication:B has not provided enough information – B did not say the exact address.
Extremeexamples of a flouting of the first maxim of Quantity are provided byutterences of patent tautologies like Women are women and War is war.[7] They aretotally noninformative according to the first maxim of Quantity and cannot beinfringe it in any conversational context. But they are informative at thelevel of what implicated, and the hearer’s identification of their informativecontent at this level is dependent on his ability to explain the speaker’sselection ofthis particular patent tautology.
Ib. Aflouting of the second maxim of Quantity.
4. A:Where’s Meredith?
B:The control room or the science lab.
Implication:B doesn’t know which of the two places Meredith is.
5. A:Excuse me–how much is this screwdriver?
B:$9.95. The saw is $39.50, and the power drill there on the table is $89.00.
Implication:B provides unnecessary additional information (marketers and salespeople oftenviolate this rule in order to increase sales).
II.Examples in which the first maxim of quality is flouted.
1. Irony:
a) Ais a good friend!
Implication:A betrays the speaker, and audience knows it.
b)Don’t be silly. I love working 80 hours a week with no vacation.
A: Alot of people are depending on you.
B:Thanks, that really takes the pressure off.
Implication:By saying something clearly untrue, B is implying that the opposite is true(sarcasm). The true meaning being expressed here is probably more like “Thatreally puts a lot of pressure on me” and perhaps, by extension, “Stoppressuring me.”
2. Metaphor:
a) You are the cream in my coffee
Implication:The speaker is attributing to his audience some feature or features inrespectof which the audience resembles the mentioned substance.
It ispossible to combine metaphor and irony by imposing on the hearer two stages oginterpretation.
Youare the cream in my coffee – can be interpreted as ‘You are my pride and joy’,or, as irony interpretant, ‘You are my bane.’
3. Meiosis
Gricehas such an example of meiosis, resulting from flouting the maxim of quality:
‘Hewas a little intoxicated’
Implication:This man is known to have broken up all the furniture.
4. Hyperbole. Usually in metaphor the second maxim of Quality isflouted.
Example:Everybody likes ice-cream.
Implication:it is clear, that there are people, who don’t like ice-cream.
It isnot easy to find examples in which the second maxim of Quality is flouted,because they are rather contextual. They could be added by gestures, intonationto make the hearer sure that the speaker has a reasonable basis for suchsayings.
Example;She’s probably deceiving her husband this evening.
Implication:the speaker posses some evidence of her love affair.
III.Examples of violation of the maxim of Relation.
Perhapsthe most important rule is that your utterances must be relevant to the currenttopic at hand; this is known as the maxim of relevance. Going off-topicconstantly will provoke displeasure with your fellow participants.[7]
A:How’s the weather today?
B:There’s a nice film opening at the theater tonight.
Implication:the answer does not correlate with the question.
Violationof this rule is quite useful in order to force a subject change:
A: Doyou really love me?
B: Ilike Ferris wheels, and college football, and things that go real fast.
Implication:Either B doesn’t want to respond to A (perhaps he has problems discussing hisfeelings) or the answer is “no.”
C:Are you ever going to pay back the money I lent you?
D:It’s very hot outside, isn’t it?
Implication:D is not ready to pay back money.
Michaelwants Pat to pass the salt. He says, «Could you pass the salt?»
Inmost cases, this question is not meant literally — it is pretty clear that Patis able to pass the salt. Therefore, the question violates some maxims, notablyRelevance.
Thisviolation of a maxim helps indicate to Pat that a non-literal use of thesentence is intended (most likely, an indirect request).[4]
IV.Examples in which maxims of Manner are flouted.
1. Ambiguity.
Whenthe speaker answers with ambiguity, the hearer should define if this ambiguitywas deliberate or accidental and react in proper way if it is a conversationalgame.
Accordingto Grice, there can be two types of deliberate ambiguity:
a) examples in which there is no difference, or no strikingdifference, between two interpretations of an utterance with respect tostraightforwardness; neither interpretation is notably more sophisticated, lessstandard. [7]
— Isought to tell my love, love that never told can be.
Implication:My love refers either to the emotions or an object of emotion, but as thesenotions are contextual synonyms, the flouting of maxim is acceptable.
b)Examples in which one interpretation is notably less straightforward thananother.
2. Obscurity.
Sometimesthe obscurity could be used in order to make the conversation unclear to thethird party of conversation.[7]
A:Shall we get something for the kids?
B: Ok. But I vetoI-C-E-C-R-E-A-M.
Implication:By spelling the word ‘ice-cream’ B wants to make the conversation unclear forchildren.
3. Failure to be brief or orderly.
Examples:
MissB sang ‘Home sweet home’ vs. Miss B produced a series of sounds thatcorresponded closely with the score of ‘Home sweet home.’
A:When are you coming home?
B: Iwill codify that question to my superiors and respond at such a time as anadequate answer is preparable.
Implication:B is using unnecessarily complicated and confusing words and construction,because
Bdoes not know or does not wish to give an answer to the question.
It isimportant to remember, that in English, speakers are accustomed to hearingevents in chronological order (in some other languages, word order isn’t asimportant.) This is why «We got married and had a baby», and «Wehad a baby and got married» have different meanings altogether.
Speakerssometimes deliberately violate the rules of ordinary conversation to achievecertain ends
Example:
1.A: Would you like to go out with Andrea?
B:Is the Pope Catholic?
Violatedmaxim: Relevance
Motivation:B is being humorous. By replying with a question whose answer is obvious, he isimplying that the answer to A’s question is equally obvious: Yes!
2. A: I’ll pay youback in full next week, I promise.
B:Sure, and pigs will fly and fish will sing.
Violatedmaxim: Relevance
Motivation:B’s response implies sarcastically that he does not believe A.
3. A: What are thethree most important things in real estate?
B:Location, location, and location.
Violatedmaxim: Quantity
Motivation:To emphasize the overwhelming importance of location
4. A: So tell me,do you like what I did to my hair?
B:Er…what’s on TV tonight?
Violatedmaxim: Relevance
Motivation:B does not like A’s hairstyle, so he changed the subject.
5. A: How can Idevelop a great body like yours?
B:Choose your parents carefully.
Violatedmaxim: Quality
Motivation:Indirectly saying that it is impossible, because it’s all in the genes.[4]
General conclusion
Theaim of our work was to describe the rules of conversation according to PaulGrice’s philosophy and demonstrate their practical application.
Atthe first part we mentioned that Paul Grice was rather a philosopher than alinguist, that’s why we made the argument for the necessity of reading Grice’s work‘Logic and conversation’ in the philosophical context, rather than inisolation. Then, a consideration of this context showed a number of themes whichrecurred: logic, conventional/non-conventional and, most importantly,rationality.
Grice’sinterests were in the system of language; that it is an example of humanrational action, and thus can be accounted for through some variety of logic(although, not traditional formal logic, perhaps). His aim was to find thelogic of conversation which could account for the gap between saying and meaning,saying and implicating, conventional and non-conventional meaning. The logic thathe sought was seen as a manifestation of rational action.
Grice’sarticles (1957, 1967) have a profound influence on speech act theory. Griceproformulated the idea that ordinary communication takes place not directly bymeans of convention, but in virtue of a speaker’s evincing certain intentionsand getting his or her audience to recognize those intentions (and to recognizethat it was the speaker’s intention to secure the recognition). In his view,the utterance is not itself communicative, but only provides clues to theintentions of the speaker. A later part of Grice’s program spelled out howvarious maxims of cooperative behavior are exploited by speaker’s intentions inuttering certain words under particular circumstances.
Gricedistinguished between what is said in making an utterance, that whichdetermines the truth value of the contribution, and the total of what iscommunicated. Things that are communicated beyond what is said (in thetechnical sense) Grice called implicatures, and those implicatures are dependupon the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative he calledconversational implicatures.
Inour work we defined that Cooperative principles is a set of maxims ofconversation and usually people follow them in order to make the communicationclear. However, it is possible to flout a maxim intentionally orunconsciously and thereby convey a different meaning than what is literallyspoken. Therefore, cooperation is still taking place, but no longer on theliteral level. Conversationalists can assume that when speakers intentionallyflout a maxim, they still do so with the aim of expressing some thought. Thus,the Gricean Maxims serve a purpose both when they are followed and when theyare flouted.
References:
1. Bach, Kent, «Conversational Impliciture.» — Mind and Language-1994 — pp.124-162.
2. Bach, Kent, «The myth of conventional implicature.»Linguistics and Philosophy. — 1999 — pp.262-283.
3. Bach, Kent, 2004, «Pragmatics and the Philosophy ofLanguage.» In Horn and Ward (eds.) – 2004 — pp. 463-87.
4. Blakemore, Diane. Understanding Utterances. Oxford: Blackwell. – 1992.
5. Carston, Robyn. «Implicature, explicature, andtruth-conditional semantics.» Reprinted in Kasher (ed.) 1998 — pp. 436-79.
6. Chapman, Siobhan. Paul Grice, philosopher and linguist.Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.-2005
7. Grice, H. Paul, «Logic and conversation.», Syntax andSemantics 3: Speech Acts, New York: Academic Press — 1975 — pp. 41-58.
8. Grice, H. Paul «Further notes on logic andconversation.» In P. Cole (ed.) – 1967.
9. Grice, H. Paul «Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions,»Philosophical Review — 1969 — pp.147-177.
10. Grice, H. Paul «Presupposition and ConversationalImplicature.» In P. Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics, New York: AcademicPress — 1981- pp. 183-97.
11. Horn, Laurence R. and Gregory Ward (eds.) The Hanbook ofPragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell. – 2004.
12. Kempson, Ruth M. «Grammar and ConversationalPrinciples.» In F. Newmeyer (ed.) Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey, Vol.II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press – 1988 — pp. 139-163.
13. Levinson, Stephen. Presumptive Meanings. Cambridge, Mass: MITPress/Bradford Books- 2000.
14. Neale, Stephen «Paul Grice and the Philosophy ofLanguage,» Linguistics and Philosophy — 1992 – pp.509-559.
15. Searle John «Indirect speech acts.» ibid. Reprinted inPragmatics: A Reader, ed. S. Davis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. -1991- pp. 265–277.
16. Thomason, R. Accommodation, meaning, and implicature:Interdisciplinary foundations for pragmatics. In Intentions in Communication,ed. P. R. Cohen, J. L. Morgan & M. Pollack, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press -1990 — pp. 325–63.
17. Van Kuppevelt, J. (1996) Inferring from topics: Scalarimplicatures as topic dependent inferences. Linguistics and Philosophy – 1996 – pp. 393–443
18. Wilson, D., and Sperber, D. On Grice’s theory of conversation. InConversation and Discourse, ed. P. Werth, New York: St. Martins Press -1981- pp. 155–78.
Internet references:
1. www.appstate.edu/mcgowant/grice.htm
2. www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooperative_principle
3. www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicature
4. www.kwary.net
5. www.ncs.ruhosting.nl/bart/talks/paris2010/lecture2.pdf
6. www.sfu.ca/jeffpell/Cogs300/GriceLogicConvers75.pdf
7. www.online.sfsu.edu/kbach/grice.htm
8. www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/grice/