Three Strikes And You

’re Out Essay, Research Paper Running head: THREE STRIKES Three Strikes and You’re Out Kelly Jay Stewart CRIM 440 21 November 2000 Three Strikes and You’re Out Samuel Walker, author of Sense and Nonsense about Crime and Drugs, presented us in his book with forty-eight propositions that dealt with crime, drugs, and our efforts toward getting rid of these problems. A few of these propositions informed us on positive actions taking place in our criminal justice system, but the majority of them told us what was not working to fight crime and drugs. One of those propositions that was a negative aspect of our justice system today in Mr. Walker’s eyes was the “three strikes and you’re out” laws (referred to here after as three strikes laws). He gives numerous reasons why this law is not considered to be an effective one. This paper will first explain Walker’s view on the issue and then review some of the current research and opinions on the matter. Samuel Walker conducted very thorough research on the propositions he presented to us in his book. His twentieth proposition read as follows; “ ‘Three strikes and you’re out’ laws are a terrible crime policy” (Walker, 1998: 140). Walker justifies his claim by asking and then explaining three questions. The first question is whether the law would actually be implemented. Walker states that “hardly any states were using there three strikes laws” (Walker, 1998: 138). California is leading the nation in prosecutions of offenders through the current two and three strikes laws (Tischler, 1999). Fifteen of the twenty-three states that have three strikes laws have incarcerated between zero and six inmates since 1993 according to The Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy (Tischler, 1999). The second reason Walker cites is the impact of the three strikes laws on the criminal justice system. These laws are affecting the system by overcrowding prisons, subjecting criminals to excessive prison terms, and costing society entirely too much money (Walker, 1998). The three strikes law in California stipulates that your first two “strikes” are acquired when you commit two serious or violent felonies. However the third strike can be any type of felony, violent or nonviolent (Schafer, 1999). For this reason, more and more criminals are being put away, especially in California, for third strikes that are nonviolent and relatively small crimes and overcrowding our prisons at a fast rate. In 1996, males under the age of twenty-five accounted for forty-five percent of the individuals arrested for index crimes (Schafer, 1999). This raises questions for skeptics of three strikes laws. Why incarcerate offenders for life when their criminal tendencies statistically drop after a certain age? These opponents assert that three strikes laws subject offenders to over-incarceration. This leads to the next issue concerning money. Burr states in his study comparing the impact of the three strikes law in California to the impact in Canada that “over-incarceration does not serve the interest of justice or the interests of the taxpayer” (2000: 5). Walker estimates that if California were to implement the new law to the full extent for the next twenty-five years, the state would have to pay an extra $5.5 billion (1998). A significant piece of this estimate would be funding the incarceration of elderly prisoners who require more funds to maintain (Walker, 1998). The third reason Walker uses to support his proposition is that the law will not reduce crime (1998). He supports this claim by stating that there is no evidence that crime has been reduced by these laws and that the law is not consistently enforced (1998). Burr affirms this statement in his own study by stating that “no study has demonstrated that the three strikes law has reduced violence” (2000). As stated earlier, the three strikes law has not been administered by all the states that currently have it either. By 1997, twenty-four states and the federal government had adopted some form of three strikes mandatory sentencing laws (Schafer, 1999). Walker suggests as well that three strikes laws are nothing new and that “most states have had some kind of habitual offender law for many decades” (1998). There are two additional considerations that have been documented supporting Walker’s claim that three strikes is a “terrible crime policy.” The first is that it has forced more criminals both underground and to become more violent. Dannie Martin, an ex-convict with seven prior felonies on his record, now a novel writer suggests through his observations that this new law has only forced criminals to work underground (1995). They are more often working alone as well and created a “nothing-left-to-lose mentality” among criminals making them even more violent (1995: 2). “If a robber has two priors, a murder and an arson is no different to him than a robbery” (1995: 2). Schafer found that fifty-four percent of offenders responding to a survey he conducted responded that they “would kill witnesses or law enforcement officers to avoid a life sentence” (1999: 10) Criminals believe that if they are going to have a mandatory sentence of life imposed on them they might as well go one step further. The other concern is the racial disparity that is seemingly spawning from this new law. Walker briefly addresses this issue stating that “African-Americans were being sent to prison thirteen times as often under the law as were whites” (1998: 140). Tischler affirms this statistic stating that “44 percent of those convicted under three strikes laws are black” (1999: 1). Along with the supporting materials to Walker’s argument there is also opposing views that say that three strikes laws are working. The first is the deterrent effect of three strikes laws. Any way you look at it, the crime rate in California since the adoption of this law in March of 1994 has significantly decreased (Schafer, 1999). There is a wide range of percentages that are given to represent this decrease. One of the more conservative statistics quotes a 26.9% decrease, or 815,000 crimes, since 1994 (Schafer, 1999). Schafer presents his deterrent argument stating that “[i]n the year prior to the law’s passage, California’s population of paroled felons increased by 226….In the year after the law’s enactment, the number of paroled felons plunged as 1,335 moved out of California” (1999: 7). Schafer conducted a survey of offenders to measure the specific and general deterrence affects, if any. The survey found that seventy-eight percent of those surveyed understood the concept of the three strikes law. Schafer found that “seventy percent said they would not or probably would not commit the crime if they knew they would receive life in prison, thus demonstrating a specific deterrent effect” (1999: 9). When asked a similar question that focused on general deterrence, that number dropped to forty percent, illustrating a weaker effect (1999: 9). While Schafer suggests that more studies similar to this one should be conducted in other states, this serves as a good starting point for assessing the deterrence effect. Schafer concludes that three strikes laws should be addressed to offenders in specific terms to maximize the deterrent effect. The second opposing view to Walker’s proposition is Secretary of State Bill Jones’ report outlining the effects of the law. Bill Jones is the author of the now famous three strikes law. His report, more than likely a little exaggerated, announces a thirty-eight percent decline in violent crime since the passage of the three strikes law (Wood, 1999). He also estimates that approximately one million crimes have been prevented and $21.7 billion in costs associated to those crimes have been saved (Wood, 1999). He recognizes, however, that the decrease in crime is not solely attributed to the three strikes law but that is definitely is “not accidental” (Wood, 1999: 2). His report has obvious flaws but is certainly something to consider when discussing the effectiveness of this law. One interesting look at the impact of the three strikes law is to view it from the eyes of the actual offender. In Martin’s article A View from the Underworld: Life After three Strikes, he tells of a friend of his that has a few prior convictions but is out of prison at the time. After trying to reach him by phone and being unsuccessful, he catches up with him sometime later. He learns that his phone was turned off and done so on purpose. Martin’s friend explains it as so: “I’m afraid that someone will call and ask me for a lawnmower part and a narcotics detective will get on the stand and say that ‘lawnmower’ part was really cocaine or heroin and I’m gone” (Martin, 1995: 2). This may serve as an example of how some criminals that roam the streets feel about the three strikes law. If they have two prior convictions, it will not take much to get that third, leaving them on thin ice. The three strikes law seems to have more going against it than for it at the present time. One major problem is that it is not enforced everywhere it is available and when enforced, it is not done so consistently. However, if this law were to be enforced as it were designed, it would have a profound effect on our crime statistics in a good way. One way to possibly confront the problem of prison overcrowding and financial burden would be the establishment of a release age wherein that criminals subjected to this law would be released after such a time. With all the research on the crime rates of certain ages, there is bound to be an age where offenders could be released with the confident assumption that they will not commit again. Three strikes laws originated from a reasonable assumption; those that have committed three felonies will probably commit again. This law should stressed harder rather than abolished. References Burr, G., Wong, S., Veen, S. & Gu, D. (2000, June). Three strikes and you’re out: An investigation of false positive rates using a Canadian sample. Federal Probation, 64, 3-7. Martin, D. (1995, September 13). A view from the underworld: Life after three strikes. Available: http://www. pacificnews. org/jinn/stories/columns/voices/950913- three-strikes.html Schafer, J. (1999, April). The deterrent effect of three strikes law. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 68, 6-11. Tischler, E. (1999, Feburary). Three strikes striking out? Corrections Today, 61, 19. Walker, S. (1998). Sense and nonsense about crime and drugs: A policy guide. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Wood, D. (1999, March 8). The impact of ‘three strikes’ laws. Christian Science Monitor, 91, 1-5. Bibliography References Burr, G., Wong, S., Veen, S. & Gu, D. (2000, June). Three strikes and you’re out: An investigation of false positive rates using a Canadian sample. Federal Probation, 64, 3-7. Martin, D. (1995, September 13). A view from the underworld: Life after three strikes. Available: http://www. pacificnews. org/jinn/stories/columns/voices/950913- three-strikes.html Schafer, J. (1999, April). The deterrent effect of three strikes law. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 68, 6-11. Tischler, E. (1999, Feburary). Three strikes striking out? Corrections Today, 61, 19. Walker, S. (1998). Sense and nonsense about crime and drugs: A policy guide. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Wood, D. (1999, March 8). The impact of ‘three strikes’ laws. Christian Science Monitor, 91, 1-5.